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2251 
Official Maps and the Regulatory Takings Problem: A 
Legislative Solution 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Official map regulations generate much uncertainty in the court 
system. For example, in Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor and Common 
Council of Englewood, a city’s official map prohibited a landowner 
from building on his property because part of his property was 
reserved to be a park in the future.1 The landowner felt that the city 
had deprived him of use of his property and challenged the 
prohibition, claiming that a regulatory taking had occurred.2 This is 
just one example of an official map restricting a landowner’s use of 
property. What should be the remedy? The answer to this question 
depends on several factors: How much time does the city have to 
decide if it will condemn his property and pay just compensation? 
How much of the land is reserved? How much economic loss will 
result if the official map is upheld? What is the city’s reason for 
freezing development?  
Courts have struggled with these questions when deciding 
whether to strike down official map provisions.3 When landowners 
have challenged the validity of official maps, courts have examined 
each set of facts on a case-by-case basis, and the result is usually 
unpredictable. Not only is the result unpredictable, but oftentimes 
landowners are deprived of the use of their property without 
compensation. 
When official maps prohibit landowners from building on their 
property, the landowners often claim that a taking has occurred. 
Thus, many courts have looked to takings cases from the Supreme 
 
 1. 237 A.2d 881, 882 (N.J. 1968). 
 2. Id. at 883. 
 3. See, e.g., Urbanizadora Versalles, Inc. v. Rivera Rios, 701 F.2d 993, 996–97 (1st 
Cir. 1983) (holding that fourteen years is an unreasonable reservation period, but suggesting 
that a period as short as five years may be constitutional); Headley v. City of Rochester, 5 
N.E.2d 198, 203 (N.Y. 1936) (holding that a restriction on twenty-five feet of a 19,000-
square-foot lot is constitutional); Rochester Bus. Inst., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 267 N.Y.S.2d 
274, 281 (App. Div. 1966) (holding that a regulation increasing construction costs by six 
percent, or $150,000, is constitutional).  
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Court.4 While these precedents have been, and may continue to be, 
helpful in a few cases, they have not been successful in resolving 
many other official map conflicts. This is partly because regulatory 
takings law is already muddled and examined on a case-by-case basis: 
Regulatory takings law combines the worst of two worlds—
constitutional law’s arid generalities and property law’s substantive 
difficulties. To hear the Supreme Court tell it, this confusion is the 
best we can expect. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New 
York City, the leading regulatory takings case of our time, the 
Supreme Court complained that regulatory takings law “has proved 
to be a problem of considerable difficulty.” “[Q]uite simply,” the 
Court confessed, it “has been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ 
for determining” regulatory takings cases.5 
This Comment will argue that official map adjudication should 
be a separate area of law from the Supreme Court’s takings cases. 
While in rare situations it is helpful to borrow from Takings Clause 
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings cases 
generally do not provide effective guidelines for official map cases. 
State legislatures should take the initiative to provide rules for 
official map cases. This solution will not only increase predictability 
but will also promote justice and efficiency. State legislatures should 
require local governments to compensate landowners during official 
map regulation periods. This requirement will force governments to 
take the planning process more seriously when deciding to reserve a 
landowner’s land. The requirement will also give governments the 
incentive to keep the time and amount of property reserved to a 
minimum, thus, limiting compensation. Although courts protect the 
property of private individuals by interpreting the Fifth Amendment 
and deciding whether certain regulations are constitutional, statutes 
can extend the protection of private individuals beyond 
constitutional protections by enacting specific rules that are governed 
by state policy. 
Part II discusses the background of official maps, their main 
purposes, and case law highlighting several of the issues involved 
with official maps. It then discusses the development of regulatory 
 
 4. See, e.g., Ward v. Bennett, 625 N.Y.S.2d 609, 612–13 (App. Div. 1995). 
 5. Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1549, 1552 (2003) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978)).  
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takings doctrine. Part III discusses how courts have looked to the 
Supreme Court cases for guidance, and how this method has proven 
ineffective. Part IV argues that the judicial system has been 
inadequate in protecting landowners’ rights, and that statutes are a 
more appropriate means of protecting landowners affected by official 
maps. Part V discusses the general principles of compensation and 
why landowners regulated by official maps should be compensated. 
Part VI introduces a proposed method of compensation, followed by 
a discussion of some questions raised by the proposed statutory 
provisions. Part VII concludes the Comment. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Official Maps 
An official map is a map of a city that precisely displays existing 
and future streets, highways, sewer systems, parks, and other public 
improvements. The main purpose of an official map is to preserve 
land for widening existing roadways or building future roadways.6 An 
official map facilitates the expansion of the city and growth of its 
population.7 It also allows the city to obtain the land at a reasonable 
rate.8 
 
 6. DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 226 (5th ed. 
2008). Commentators have further explained the functions of an official map:  
  In essence the official map is a simple device. It is one way, but not the only 
way, to fix building lines. The official map may plat future as well as existing streets. 
Where future streets are mapped, subdividers must conform to the mapped street 
lay-out, unless they can prevail upon the proper officials to amend the map. Public 
sewer and water will be installed only in the bed of the mapped streets. Even more 
important, a landowner who builds in the bed of the mapped street may be refused 
compensation for his building when the street is ultimately opened and the mapped 
land taken. . . . 
  The official map of future streets has obvious advantages in terms of the public 
coffers. It assures that land needed for future streets will be available at bare land 
prices. Mapping of future streets also gives direction and pattern to future growth of 
the community, though some feel that the map casts the mold too inflexibly, 
especially if minor as well as major streets are mapped.  
  Where existing streets have been officially mapped, the map will often set 
widening lines (set-backs) warning that new structures must be located in 
conformance with their lines, and these also have obvious advantages in cutting 
costs of street widening. 
Joseph C. Kucirek & J. H. Beuscher, Wisconsin’s Official Map Law: Its Current Popularity and 
Implications for Conveyancing and Planning, 1957 WIS. L. REV. 176, 177 (footnote omitted). 
 7. See In re Phila. Parkway, 95 A. 429, 430 (Pa. 1915). 
 8. See, e.g., Kucirek & Beuscher, supra note 6, at 177. 
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The validity of official maps was first questioned in courts as early 
as 1836, when Brooklyn’s official map was challenged in In re 
Furman Street.9 The court in this case refused to compensate 
landowners that had built on the mapped street, reasoning that “[i]f 
the legislature did not intend that the streets should be opened at a 
future period without paying for improvements made upon them in 
the meantime, the provision [for mapping] was worse than 
useless.”10 
Thus, official map statutes began to prohibit improvements on 
mapped property, and landowners began to question the 
constitutionality of these statutes that deprived them the right to 
develop their property.11 Courts have expressed various views as to 
whether this prohibition against improving property on mapped land 
is an unconstitutional taking of property.12 
1. Florida cases  
Even within a single state, official map case law can be confusing 
and contradictory. In the early 1990s, the Florida Supreme Court 
decided several mapping cases, and the court had to be creative to fit 
its various holdings together. First, in Joint Ventures, Inc. v. 
Department of Transportation, the court invalidated a Florida statute 
that authorized the filing of reservation maps by the state 
department of transportation.13 The purpose of the reservation maps 
was to prohibit any development and freeze land values on property 
planned for future road use.14 The court struck down the statute as 
an improper use of police power.15 
 
 9. 17 Wend. 649 (N.Y. 1836). 
 10. Id. at 657; see also In re Pittsburgh Dist., 2 Watts & Serg. 320, 324 (Pa. 1841) 
(upholding the validity of street mapping: “But then the mere laying of [streets] out cannot be 
said, of itself, to be a taking of the property of the individuals, upon which they are laid out, 
for public use at some future day, but rather a designation of what may be required for that 
purpose thereafter; so that the owners of the property may in due time be fully apprized of 
what is anticipated, and regulate the subsequent improvements, which they shall make thereon, 
accordingly.”). 
 11. PATRICIA E. SALKIN, 3 AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 30.3 (5th ed. 2011). Others 
complain that an official map “casts the mold too inflexibly, especially if minor as well as major 
streets are mapped.” Kucirek & Beuscher, supra note 6, at 177.  
 12. See sources cited supra note 3. 
 13. 563 So.2d 622, 623 (Fla. 1990). 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. at 623, 626. 
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Although the Florida Supreme Court invalidated the reservation 
maps that reserved landowners’ land, the court did not protect every 
affected landowner. In Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway 
Authority v. A.G.W.S. Corp., the court held that landowners with 
land inside the boundaries of the invalidated maps of reservation 
were not entitled to receive compensation based on a per se taking.16 
Instead, each property owner would have to show that the 
reservation map resulted in a loss of substantially all of the 
economically beneficial or productive use of land.17 
A few years later, the Florida Supreme Court again was faced 
with an official map question that required the court to analogize 
and distinguish its prior holdings. In Palm Beach County v. Wright, 
the court upheld an official map that provided for the acquisition of 
existing and future rights-of-way.18 Owners of affected property 
claimed that the official map was unconstitutional and that it was 
indistinguishable from the invalidated maps in Joint Ventures.19 But 
the court in Wright pointed out that the A.G.W.S. court had held 
that the map’s restrictions did not constitute a per se taking; thus, 
the adoption of the Palm Beach County official map would not 
constitute a per se taking.20 The court in Wright upheld the official 
map, recognizing the importance of planning for future growth.21  
2. Time period 
Courts examine several factors to determine whether an official 
map is reasonable and, therefore, constitutional. One of these factors 
is the amount of time that the municipality reserves the land before 
making the final decision on whether or not to use its eminent 
domain power and purchase the property. Courts, however, have 
been inconsistent in determining the duration required to make a 
reservation unconstitutional. In Benenson v. United States, the Court 
of Claims held that a five-year period of restricting landowners from 
selling their property or using it for an income-producing purpose 
was unreasonable.22 In Urbanizadora Versalles, Inc. v. Rivera Rios, 
 
 16. 640 So.2d 54, 58 (Fla. 1994). 
 17. Id. 
 18. 641 So.2d 50, 53–54 (Fla. 1994). 
 19. Id. at 52. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 53–54. 
 22. 548 F.2d 939, 947–48 (Ct. Cl. 1977). 
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the First Circuit held that a reservation period of fourteen years was 
unreasonable and thus unconstitutional.23 But the Urbanizadora 
court referred to Benenson and suggested that the Urbanizadora 
court might not have held a period as short as five years to be 
unreasonable.24 Surprisingly, other courts have allowed reservation 
periods lasting more than twenty years. 25 
State courts could benefit greatly from some bright-line guidance 
in this area, given the striking disparity among states regarding what 
is unreasonable. Unfortunately, they are unlikely to get that kind of 
guidance from the Supreme Court because, as will be shown, takings 
jurisprudence invites ad hoc, case-by-case analysis rather than the 
drawing of hard and fast lines.26 
3. Reasonable use of land 
Another factor that courts examine in determining the 
reasonableness of an official map regulation is whether or not 
landowners retain reasonable use of their land. In examining this 
factor, courts look to the landowner’s economic loss and the amount 
of land that is regulated. In Headley v. City of Rochester, the New 
York Court of Appeals upheld an official map that prohibited the 
issuance of building permits for property on mapped streets.27 In this 
case, the official map restricted only 25 feet of the landowner’s 
19,000-square-foot plot of land.28 Because the restriction affected 
such a small portion of the landowner’s property, the court upheld 
the regulation without compensation.29 
Thirty years later, the New York Supreme Court’s Appellate 
Division upheld a set-back regulation for future street widening in 
 
 23. 701 F.2d 993, 997 (1st Cir. 1983). 
 24. Id. at 996–97; see also Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Chadwick, 
405 A.2d 241, 250 (Md. 1979) (holding that a three-year reservation period is excessive and 
an abuse of the police power); Ward v. Bennett, 625 N.Y.S.2d 609, 612–13 (App. Div. 1995) 
(holding that the refusal of a building permit for a fifty-year-old mapped street constitutes a 
taking of property where the law permitted a ten-year reservation period); MODEL LAND DEV. 
CODE §§ 3-105, 3-202 note (1975) (setting the maximum reservation period at five years and 
stating that anything beyond that would be “inequitable”). 
 25. E.g., Lord Calvert Theatre, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 119 A.2d 415 (Md. 1956); 
Rochester Bus. Inst., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 267 N.Y.S.2d 274 (App. Div. 1966). 
 26. See Part II.B infra. 
 27. 5 N.E.2d 198, 209–10 (N.Y. 1936). 
 28. Id. at 201. 
 29. Id. at 201–02. 
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the same city.30 The official map required a fourteen-foot setback, 
which is the required distance of a structure from the edge of the lot, 
on the landowner’s property.31 The landowner claimed that this 
would amount to a taking because it would require him to replan the 
project, increasing costs by six percent.32 The court determined that 
the constitutionality of the official map would depend on a balancing 
test weighing the amount of damage to the landowner against the 
effect upon the public purpose for the regulation and advancement 
of the general welfare.33 The court held that the six percent increase 
in construction costs was trivial damage when compared to the great 
injury to the general welfare that would result if the city was unable 
to plan for the improvement of traffic conditions.34 
Other courts have struck down official maps that excessively 
burden landowners. In Grosso v. Board of Adjustment of Millburn, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court found that restricting a landowner’s 
entire property in the bed of a proposed street would be 
unconstitutional.35 While the state may use its police power for the 
benefit of the public, it may not exceed constitutional boundaries.36  
While the Grosso court easily concluded that an official map that 
restricts a landowner’s entire property is unconstitutional, other 
courts have had to determine the constitutionality of official maps 
that burden the majority, but not all, of a landowner’s property. In 
Jensen v. City of New York, seventy-eight percent of a landowner’s 
property lay within the confines of a mapped street.37 The court held 
the official map to be invalid because it denied the landowner the use 
 
 30. Rochester, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 274, 276, 281. 
 31. Id. at 277. 
 32. Id. at 277–78. 
 33. Id. at 279 (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)). 
 34. Id. at 280 (“If the minimal damage to plaintiffs involved here by enforcement of the 
setback restriction renders the specific application of the Rochester Plan unconstitutional, then 
the public is in grave danger of being deprived of the very valuable tool of city planning for the 
future.”). 
 35. 61 A.2d 167, 169 (N.J. 1948). 
 36. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415–16 (“The general rule at least is, that while property 
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. 
. . . We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition 
is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of 
paying for the change. As we already have said, this is a question of degree—and therefore 
cannot be disposed of by general propositions.”). 
 37. 369 N.E.2d 1179, 1180 (N.Y. 1977) (Cook, J., dissenting). 
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of her property.38 Although the Grosso case involved a situation 
where all of the landowner’s land was restricted, the court in Jensen 
ruled that seventy-eight percent deprivation of land use was enough 
to declare the official map unconstitutional. Thus, the Jensen case 
exemplifies the problem of unpredictability in official maps 
adjudication. 
All of these individual issues hint at two overarching and 
competing goals: the courts’ desire to be fair to landowners and the 
necessity of ensuring that the government and taxpayers are not 
required to pay for every land use change or government initiative. 
Courts have had extreme difficulty reconciling these goals. 
B. Regulatory Takings Doctrine 
Most states do not have comprehensive official maps legislation, 
and, as a result, courts have addressed most official map issues 
through the regulatory takings doctrine. The regulatory takings 
doctrine stems from the Fifth Amendment’s declaration that private 
property will not be taken for public use without just 
compensation.39 Courts have had difficulty examining fact patterns 
and determining when regulatory measures constitute takings: “For 
many, takings law is, or at least has been, at best, extraordinarily 
complex, and, at worst, hopelessly muddled.”40 One of the first cases 
involving regulatory takings was Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.41 
 
 38. Id. at 1179–80 (majority opinion). 
 39. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 40. CALLIES ET AL., supra note 6, at 320. For more discussion on the confusion 
involved with the regulatory takings doctrine see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (noting that the Court “has been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ 
for determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by public 
action” demand compensation); see also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 8 (1977) (describing regulatory takings doctrine as “a chaos of confused 
argument”); J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings 
Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 102 (1995) (referring to regulatory takings doctrine as an 
“unworkable muddle” and noting that “regulatory takings doctrine has generated a plethora of 
inconsistent and open-ended formulations that have failed to make sense”); John E. Fee, The 
Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1006–07 (2003) (describing 
regulatory takings law as a “jurisprudential mess”); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why 
the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 562 (1984) (describing regulatory 
takings doctrine as a muddle: “[C]ommentators propose test after test to define ‘takings,’ 
while courts continue to reach ad hoc determinations rather than principled resolutions.”). 
 41. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Many legal scholars blame the Mahon case for causing most 
of the confusion about takings. E.g., Byrne, supra note 40, at 97 (calling Mahon “a wretched 
decision, inadequately explained and having no foundation in precedent”); Rose, supra note 
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In the opinion, Justice Holmes pointed out that “[g]overnment 
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property 
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the 
general law.”42 But, he continued, “The general rule at least is, that 
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation 
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”43 Unfortunately, 
Justice Holmes did not explain when a regulation “goes too far.” 
The Supreme Court did not hear another regulatory takings case 
until Penn Central, more than fifty years after Mahon. And when the 
Court finally returned to the issue, it did not do much to make 
Mahon’s “goes too far” test any easier to apply than when it was 
announced by Justice Holmes. Aside from two narrow bright-line 
rules, regulatory takings law is currently dominated by the factors of 
the ad hoc Penn Central test. The following sections will discuss the 
regulatory takings cases that have shaped the law. These regulatory 
takings cases do not serve as effective guidelines to follow for official 
maps cases because (1) regulatory takings cases are already muddled 
and (2) official maps cases are distinguishable from the fact patterns 
involved in the takings cases decided by the Supreme Court. 
1. Per se rules  
The Supreme Court established two per se rules regarding the 
regulatory takings doctrine: (1) any permanent physical occupation 
qualifies as a regulatory taking and (2) any deprivation of all the 
economically beneficial use of the property also qualifies as a 
regulatory taking. 
The Supreme Court established the first of the per se rules in 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.44 In Loretto, a New 
York statute permitted a television company to install its cable 
facilities on a landowner’s apartment building.45 The Court held that 
even though the cables occupied a small space, a permanent physical 
occupation qualifies as a regulatory taking.46  
 
40, at 562. 
 42. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413. 
 43. Id. at 415. 
 44. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 45. Id. at 423. 
 46. Id. at 426. 
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The “deprivation of all economically beneficial use” rule was 
established in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.47 In Lucas, 
the Court held that if landowners are deprived of all economically 
beneficial use of their property, such deprivation constitutes a 
taking.48 This “deprivation of all economically beneficial use” rule 
has been heavily criticized because the rule will compensate a 
landowner only in the extremely rare instance of a total loss of 
value.49 For example, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, a landowner’s 
claim failed the Lucas test because the landowner’s property 
diminished only 93.7% in value, as opposed to the necessary 100%.50  
2. Penn Central test 
In Mahon, Justice Holmes explained that when a regulation 
“goes too far,” it is a taking.51 This general rule, and Justice 
Holmes’s reluctance to promulgate a standard for when a regulation 
“goes too far,” initiated the inconsistency in regulatory takings 
cases52 and led to the Penn Central balancing test. In Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City, the Supreme Court admitted 
that it had “been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for 
determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require that economic 
injuries caused by public action be compensated.”53 Rather, the 
Court stated that it makes its determinations ad hoc after looking at 
the particular facts of each case.54 In making these determinations, 
the Court created a balancing test in Penn Central that examines 
several significant factors: the economic impact of the regulation on 
the landowner, interference with the owner’s investment-backed 
expectations, and the character of the governmental action.55 As 
many commentators have argued, these factors create a bigger mess 
 
 47. 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). 
 48. Id. at 1016. 
 49. Id. at 1019 n.8 (“Justice Stevens criticizes the ‘deprivation of all economically 
beneficial use’ rule as ‘wholly arbitrary,’ in that ‘[the] landowner whose property is diminished 
in value 95% recovers nothing,’ while the landowner who suffers a complete elimination of 
value ‘recovers the land’s full value.’” (quoting id. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting))).  
 50. 533 U.S. 606, 630–31 (2001). 
 51. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 52. See Byrne, supra note 40, at 103. 
 53. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 54. Id.; see also United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958). 
 55. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
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because each of the factors must be balanced by the facts of the case, 
forcing judges to make “open-ended value judgments.”56  
3. Temporary regulatory takings 
The Supreme Court has also been faced with the 
constitutionality of temporary regulatory takings. In Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, a 
planning agency adopted regulations to limit land use in order to 
protect Lake Tahoe.57 The agency enacted a moratorium that froze 
new development activity for a time while it created a long-term, 
permanent plan, and the landowners claimed this was a regulatory 
taking.58 The Court held that the moratorium did not constitute a 
per se taking but should be analyzed by the Penn Central test.59 The 
Lucas claim was rejected here because there was no permanent 
deprivation of all economically viable use.60 Thus, a temporary 
restriction would not rise to the level required by Lucas.61 The Court 
pointed out that with a moratorium there is a clear “reciprocity of 
advantage” because it will protect all affected landowners against 
immediate construction that may later be inconsistent with the 
adopted plan.62 But, as the Court noted, “It may well be true that 
any moratorium that lasts for more than one year should be viewed 
with special skepticism.”63 
III. REGULATORY TAKINGS CASES ARE NOT HELPFUL IN SOLVING 
OFFICIAL MAPS CASES 
Courts have typically applied takings precedent in official map 
cases because of the seeming similarity between the two. When an 
official map deprives landowners of the use of their property, the 
landowners typically challenge the regulation by claiming that the 
government has violated the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that 
“private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just 
 
 56. Byrne, supra note 40, at 104. 
 57. 535 U.S. 302, 306, 310 (2002). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 321. 
 60. Id. at 331–32. 
 61. CALLIES ET AL., supra note 6, at 363. 
 62. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 341 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 
(1922)). 
 63. Id. 
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compensation.”64 Because the claims are typically framed this way, 
courts confronted with official map issues have looked to regulatory 
takings cases for guidance.  
A. Per Se Rules 
The per se rules are not very helpful in determining official maps 
cases. First, the permanent physical occupation rule will generally not 
apply because official maps plot out future roadways. True, the 
official map regulations may prohibit the landowner from obtaining 
a building permit, but no actual physical occupation takes place until 
the property is condemned and paid for. In Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission, the Court reasoned that an easement qualifies 
as a permanent physical occupation.65 However, this view will not 
apply in official map cases. Even if a landowner owns property in the 
bed of a mapped street, the landowner still owns legal title; neither 
the government nor the public has the right to intrude on the 
landowner’s property solely because it is plotted on the official map. 
Even though the owner’s use of her land may be extremely limited 
by the official map, it is not until the government actually follows 
through on the map and takes the owner’s land that she loses her 
right to exclude—and thereby finally gains a right to compensation. 
Furthermore, the Lucas deprivation-of-all-beneficial-use rule will 
not be very helpful in official maps cases because seldom will 
landowners lose all beneficial use of their property when their land is 
mapped on the official map. Landowners can generally continue to 
use their property in the same manner it has been used before their 
property was mapped; they are only prohibited from building in the 
bed of a mapped street. Official map regulations usually reserve 
landowners’ land for a specific time period, and at the end of the 
reservation period, either the restriction is revoked or the land is 
purchased by the government. Therefore, the official map will not 
render the property valueless, as required by Lucas, because the 
landowner “will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.”66 
To determine whether the land has any value, the Court examines 
the “parcel as a whole.”67 The “parcel as a whole” not only involves 
 
 64. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 65. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831–32 (1987). 
 66. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332. 
 67. Id. at 331. 
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the physical aspects of the property but temporal aspects as well.68 
Therefore, a landowner’s future interest in property, though 
restricted by an official map, still has value, and therefore the Lucas 
rule is generally inapplicable. 
The Lucas rule, however, may be applicable in rare situations. In 
Ward v. Bennett, for example, a state court followed Lucas in 
determining that an official map was invalid because it deprived the 
owner of all economic beneficial use.69 But this is one of the 
“extraordinary case[s]” for which the Lucas rule was carved out, and 
in most situations an owner will be left with at least some beneficial 
use.70 
B. Penn Central Balancing Test 
The Penn Central balancing test will not serve as an effective 
guideline to follow in official maps cases. The inconsistency and 
unpredictable nature of takings cases are largely a result of the Penn 
Central balancing test.71 The unpredictability of the Penn Central 
test complicates official maps conflicts since most takings claims will 
have to be resolved under the Penn Central test because of the 
stringent standards of the Loretto and Lucas rules.72  
Using an ad hoc test is more problematic in official maps cases 
than the average takings case. Official maps are a unique form of 
regulation because they are essentially intended as precursors to 
actual takings—the government is actually planning in most cases on 
paying just compensation for the land at some point in the future. 
This factor is missing from nearly every other type of regulation that 
is challenged as a taking. And it makes a balancing test extremely 
challenging. In evaluating the effect of the regulation on the owner’s 
value and investment-backed expectations, for example, courts could 
understandably find it difficult to ignore the fact that the landowner 
will eventually be entitled to just compensation anyway. In addition, 
 
 68. Id. at 331–32.  
 69. Ward v. Bennett, 625 N.Y.S.2d 609, 613 (App. Div. 1995). In Ward, the 
landowner was denied the right to construct a single-family dwelling in the bed of a mapped 
street. Id. at 609–10.   
 70. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332. 
 71. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 72. For example, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630–32 (2001), the Court 
could not apply the Lucas rule because there was only a 93.7% diminution in value, and this 
did not qualify as deprivation of all economically viable use of property. 
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the temporary nature of an official map reservation distinguishes it 
from other regulations, which generally have no expiration date. So, 
while the attributes of the official map, if viewed in isolation, might 
tempt courts to reject takings challenges, the ultimate consequence 
of most official maps—complete deprivation of essentially all 
property rights—could easily counterbalance that temptation. And as 
state court rulings have shown, the result of this dichotomy has been 
a complete lack of uniformity when it comes to official maps 
jurisprudence. 
C. Temporary Takings Cases 
The Tahoe-Sierra case comes closest to the fact patterns of 
official map cases because it also involved temporary regulatory 
takings.73 One distinguishing factor would be the time of the 
restriction. Most moratoria are relatively short, whereas official maps 
generally involve longer periods of time.74 In fact, the Court in 
Tahoe-Sierra said that a moratorium lasting longer than one year 
should be viewed with skepticism.75 Another distinguishing factor is 
that a moratorium is “the suspension of a specific activity”;76 the 
suspension will end, freeing the owner from a government-imposed 
burden. On the contrary, official map regulations usually end with 
actual takings; landowners cannot be certain whether they will ever 
again be able to use their land as they please.  
The current state of regulatory takings law is too unpredictable. 
Official map regulations are similar to takings cases, and thus courts 
have tried to follow regulatory takings precedents; however, this has 
not proven effective. Takings law is so complicated in the context of 
official maps that it justifies a fresh solution, and one that does not 
follow the traditional tests. Part IV explains why legislatures can 
better provide predictability and fairness to landowners than courts 
can. 
 
 73. In Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 306, a planning agency enacted a moratorium that 
froze new development while the agency established a long-term plan. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 74. See cases cited supra note 25. 
 75. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 341. 
 76. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1101 (9th ed. 2009). 
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IV. THE INADEQUACY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
The failure of the regulatory takings doctrine indicates a need for 
more legislation in this area. A major reason that courts have been 
largely unsuccessful is that courts do not have the freedom to do 
what legislatures can do—design specific rules that are governed by 
state policy. Courts can only outline the contours of what is or is not 
constitutional. Often there are constitutional values that extend 
beyond the actual rules that courts will enforce. Thus, many state 
legislatures have responded with statutes when they have disagreed 
with the courts.77 
For example, in Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the city’s use of its eminent domain power to promote 
economic development.78 While many landowners complained that 
this was unjust, the Court pointed out that its only role was to 
decide whether promoting economic development serves a “public 
purpose,” and the Court ultimately concluded that it does.79 The 
Court added that any state may place more stringent standards on its 
takings power.80 After Kelo, many states recognized that courts do 
not always create workable or fair standards, so many states have 
created their own standards to increase protection for landowners.81 
Several movements have ensued to tighten regulatory takings 
standards developed in the courts. These efforts “impose procedural 
steps to be followed in the adoption and application of land use 
regulations or establish new causes of action for landowners 
requiring compensation for any reduction [or at least a more modest 
reduction than required by courts] in property value.”82 For 
example, the state of Oregon enacted a statute that required 
compensation when a land use regulation caused any reduction in 
 
 77. CALLIES ET AL., supra note 6, at 387–88. 
 78. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 79. Id. at 484. 
 80. Id. at 489 (“We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from 
placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power. Indeed, many States already 
impose ‘public use’ requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline. Some of these 
requirements have been established as a matter of state constitutional law, while others are 
expressed in state eminent domain statutes that carefully limit the grounds upon which takings 
may be exercised.”). 
 81. CALLIES ET AL., supra note 6, at 305 (explaining that 34 states had either amended 
their constitutions or enacted legislation in the aftermath of Kelo). 
 82. Id. at 387. 
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fair market value.83 This statute has since been amended to be less 
radical, but it still offers landowners much more protection than the 
courts will.84 
These state-enacted statutes are beneficial because they protect 
landowners and provide predictability. Justice Antonin Scalia has 
stated that “uncertainty has been regarded as incompatible with the 
Rule of Law.”85 He has continued on to say that “[p]redictability . . . 
is a needful characteristic of any law worthy of the name.”86 A statute 
that provides a specific formula for providing compensation to 
landowners will increase predictability in the law. If the statute 
provides compensation to all landowners that are regulated by an 
official map, each landowner and the local government will know 
what to expect—the landowner will receive compensation and the 
government will pay compensation. The unpredictability of the Penn 
Central test will be avoided as courts will not have to determine 
which landowners’ investment-backed expectations or economic 
losses are sufficient to amount to a taking. The following section 
discusses a similar statute already in existence and its implications. 
A. The New Jersey Statute 
New Jersey has already experimented with a compensation 
statute in the official map context. New Jersey case law and statutes 
provide a great example of a state protecting the property rights of 
its citizens. In Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor and Common Council of City 
of Englewood,87 a landowner applied for subdivision approval of his 
property.88 While the application was pending, the city placed the 
land on the official map and reserved it for use as a park.89 Pursuant 
to a New Jersey state statute, the ordinance prohibited the 
landowner from developing the land for a one-year period.90 Before 
the landowner’s subdivision application was approved, the landowner 
challenged the constitutionality of the state statute that allowed for 
 
 83. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.305 (West 2009). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 
(1989). 
 86. Id. 
 87. 237 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1968). 
 88. Id. at 882. 
 89. Id. at 883. 
 90. Id. 
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prohibiting development of the land for one year without 
compensation.91 The court upheld the statute but also stated that the 
statute was enacted with the intent to compensate the landowner 
during the freezing period.92 The court held that “[t]he landowner 
should receive the value of an ‘option’ to purchase the land for the 
year. The ‘option’ price should, among other features, reflect the 
amount of taxes accruing during the ‘option’ period.”93 
After Lomarch was decided, the New Jersey legislature amended 
the statute in accordance with the decision. The court would no 
longer have to presume the intent to compensate because the new 
statute included a compensation requirement for actual loss during a 
reservation period.94 New Jersey Statute 40:55D–44 exemplifies 
justness and fairness to a landowner who is regulated by an official 
map: 
If . . . the official map provides for the reservation of designated 
streets, public drainageways, flood control basins, or public areas 
within the proposed development . . . [t]he planning board may 
reserve the location [of designated streets or public areas] . . . for a 
period of 1 year after the approval of the final plat or within such 
further time as may be agreed to by the developer . . . .  
The developer shall be entitled to just compensation for actual loss 
found to be caused by such temporary reservation and deprivation 
of use. In such instance, unless a lesser amount has previously been 
mutually agreed upon, just compensation shall be deemed to be the 
fair market value of an option to purchase the land reserved for the 
period of reservation . . . .95  
This New Jersey statute provides landowners with a remedy 
when deprived of the use of their land. If all states adopted a similar 
statute, it would resolve the difficulty of trying to decipher the 
regulatory takings cases in court. State legislatures have the 
discretion to use their own provisions to align with their state policy. 
For example, the New Jersey statute allows the planning board to 
reserve the land mapped on the official map for one year after the 
approval of the final plat, or longer if agreed upon by the 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 884. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D–44 (West 2011). 
 95. Id. 
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landowner.96 Understandably, other states may not want to set a 
time limit on a reservation because it may be years before it is 
necessary to build a future roadway. Instead, states may decide to 
allow reservations lasting many years and pay for the reservation 
while the landowner is deprived use of the land. 
V. THE COMPENSATION REQUIREMENT 
Legislatures must determine whether they want to compensate 
landowners who have building restrictions imposed on them by 
official maps. Requiring compensation is important because it 
requires the government to take the planning process seriously and 
promotes justice by protecting private individuals’ property rights. 
Further, a statute that specifies what qualifies for compensation will 
increase predictability. However, predictability should not be the 
only reason for implementing a compensation statute because a rule 
that provides no compensation to landowners would be equally 
predictable. But offering no compensation to burdened landowners 
weakens property rights, which are strongly protected in the 
Constitution. Therefore, this Comment recommends that restricted 
landowners should be compensated. 
A. Landowners Should Receive Compensation 
Landowners whose land is restricted by an official map should be 
compensated because it is just and fair to do so. The Fifth 
Amendment requires the government to pay compensation to 
landowners whose land is taken by the government.97 One benefit of 
providing compensation is that it will encourage local governments 
to take the planning process more seriously.98 Official maps are 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 98. See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“After all, if a policeman must know the Constitution, then 
why not a planner?”); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los 
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321–22 (“We realize that even our present holding will undoubtedly 
lessen to some extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners and governing bodies of 
municipal corporations when enacting land-use regulation. But such consequences necessarily 
flow from any decision upholding a claim . . . designed to limit the flexibility and freedom of 
governmental authorities, and the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment is one of 
them. As Justice Holmes aptly noted more than 50 years ago, ‘a strong public desire to 
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut 
than the constitutional way of paying for the change.’”); see also supra text accompanying note 
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required to be “precise, accurate and legally binding.”99 Through the 
process of adopting an official map, the government should direct 
studies to ensure that the land will be necessary for future public use. 
Additionally, requiring compensation for landowners regulated 
by official maps will deter the government from attempting to freeze 
land values in bad faith100 because the government will have to pay 
for the property during the reservation period. The government 
must not place regulations on property with no other purpose than 
to keep land values low until the government is ready to purchase 
the property.101  
Further, property rights have been protected since the founding 
of America. The Framers valued property ownership as an 
unalienable right that represented freedom.102 To support this 
freedom, the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
stands as a bulwark to protect individuals’ property from being taken 
for public use without just compensation.103 This requires the 
government to compensate landowners who have been deprived use 
of their property, especially if they have been singled out to bear a 
burden for the benefit of the community.104 Landowners who are 
affected by official map provisions fit this category. For example, 
landowners who are unable to build on a future street are singled 
out, while the rest of the community is not affected by the official 
map but will likely benefit when the road is built. Therefore, the 
government should compensate these landowners in order to offer 
private individuals more property protection. 
 
25 (discussing local governments that have allowed extremely long reservation periods, and 
thus little planning). 
 99. Kucirek & Beuscher, supra note 6, at 178–79. 
 100. See Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 626 (Fla. 1990).  
 101. Alan Romero, Reducing Just Compensation for Anticipated Condemnations, 21 J. 
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 153, 162–63 (2006) (explaining that the government is “taking” the 
property if the regulation serves no purpose other than reducing the compensation that must 
be paid when the property is actually condemned). 
 102. Norman Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nollan to Lochner, 17 SW. U. L. REV. 627, 
637–38 (1988). 
 103. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 104. See Fee, supra note 40, at 1007 (“The default ‘bundle of rights’ inherent in private 
property includes an affirmative ‘right to use’ one’s private assets, which may not be denied 
without compensation. This right to use, however, is inherently bounded by the government’s 
power to restrict an owner’s conduct through general laws. The proper role of the Takings 
Clause is to require compensation in those circumstances where the government legitimately 
targets merely one or a few owners to bear a unique legal burden for the benefit of the general 
community.”). 
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On the other hand, if state legislatures decided that no 
landowner affected by an official map will receive compensation 
during a reservation period, it would increase predictability. It would 
save the government and taxpayers’ money, as compensating all 
landowners who are deprived of building on their land could be 
quite expensive. If a local government adopts an official map that 
affects many landowners, it could cause many claims at once and 
financially burden the local government. The up-front cost could be 
too burdensome. 
But, depending on the state’s statute, requiring the government 
to pay during the temporary reservation period could actually 
decrease the lump sum that the government would have to pay later 
on when the land is actually acquired. When the city adopts the 
official map, the city is planning on purchasing the property anyway, 
so it would actually relieve the financial burden by spreading out the 
cost over time.  
Some states may require compensation to all landowners during 
the reservation period and may not allow the payments during the 
reservation period to be subtracted from the cost when the land is 
purchased. Again, in these instances the compensation during the 
temporary reservation will be quite low, so it should not be a great 
burden on the government to pay this compensation.  
In the end, protecting the property of private individuals 
outweighs the government’s ability to reserve land without paying 
for it, even if it is expensive. 
B. How to Compensate 
Legal scholars have continually debated the question of what 
constitutes “just compensation.” Generally, the owner should be put 
in as good of a position as he or she would have been in had the land 
never been taken.105 The owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain, is the 
basic measure of just compensation.106 The generally accepted 
measure of recovery is the fair market value, or what a willing buyer 
would pay to a willing seller.107 Others argue that just compensation 
should exceed fair market value when the government requires the 
 
 105. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934). 
 106. United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 281 (1943). 
 107. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373–74 (1943).  
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taking of one’s home.108 These methods, however, will not work well 
for official maps, so this Comment will propose a new compensation 
method. But first, a number of compensation methods will be 
explored along with the reasons they will not work for official maps. 
1. Temporary regulatory takings 
Courts use a variety of methods to compute compensation for 
temporary regulatory takings.109 Just compensation for temporary 
takings should reflect the value of the property’s use for the time 
period that the land was taken.110 But the value should be less than 
the fair market value required for a permanent taking, because after 
the temporary taking the property is returned to the landowner with 
full beneficial use.111 The following sections will outline several 
methods that courts use to determine just compensation for 
temporary takings. Exploring these various methods is important 
because municipalities occasionally do not follow through with 
official map provisions, which essentially means that the land was 
temporarily taken.  
a. Fair rental value. One measure that has been used is the land’s 
fair rental value, where the compensation is calculated as the 
supposed rental value the landowner would have received during the 
temporary reservation.112 This method is generally only useful when 
the property already has an existing use; in contrast, most takings 
cases, including official maps, involve restrictions on future use of 
property.113 Thus, courts and commentators discourage using the fair 
rental value method for undeveloped property because of “[t]he 
speculation involved in assigning a rental value for unimproved 
land.”114 
 
 108. See John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
783, 785 (2006). 
 109. See Daniel L. Siegel & Robert Meltz, Temporary Takings: Settled Principles and 
Unresolved Questions, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 479, 515 (2010). 
 110. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 319 (1987). 
 111. See Siegel & Meltz, supra note 109, at 511. 
 112. See Yuba Natural Res., Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1990); City 
of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978). 
 113. Siegel & Meltz, supra note 109, at 513. 
 114. Id. at 514. 
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b. Lost use. Another measure is lost use, or the amount the 
landowner would have expected to earn if the land was available for 
use.115 This method may be helpful because it will limit recovery in 
instances where a landowner has no plans during the temporary 
restriction period to develop the land. 
c. Option price. In Lomarch, the court determined compensation 
as an option price, or the value of an option to purchase the land 
during the temporary taking.116 The option price measure provides 
several advantages: it reflects the property interest taken from the 
landowner, and because there is a market for options to purchase 
undeveloped land, the value can be compared to those options.117 
But, like other methods, the option price method still can be 
speculative in nature. 
d. Before and after valuation. Another method to determine just 
compensation for temporary takings is the before and after valuation 
of the property.118 Courts and commentators have openly criticized 
this method of valuation: “A moment’s thought reveals that this 
standard corresponds only loosely, if at all, to the Supreme Court’s 
call for a criterion based on the value of use during the restriction 
period.”119 Thus, it is rarely used. 
2. Official maps 
While the various methods determining just compensation for 
temporary regulatory takings120 appear helpful, the problem with 
choosing any one of the temporary takings methods is that it is 
uncertain whether the official map regulation will in fact be a 
temporary regulation. For example, in Lomarch, after a one-year 
reservation period, the court decided to allow the landowner to 
subdivide the property.121 The court ordered the city to pay the 
landowner the market value of an option to buy the land during that 
 
 115. See 520 E. 81st St. Assocs. v. New York, 780 N.E.2d 518 (N.Y. 2002). 
 116. See Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor of Englewood, 237 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1968). 
 117. See Siegel & Meltz, supra note 109, at 515–16; Joseph P. Mikitish, Note, Measuring 
Damages for Temporary Regulatory Takings: Against Undue Formalism, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 985, 
1001 (1990). 
 118. See Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 896 F.2d 1347 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 119. Siegel & Meltz, supra note 109, at 515; see also Wheeler, 896 F.2d at 1351. 
 120. See supra Part V.B.1. 
 121. Lomarch, 237 A.2d at 884. 
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one year period.122 In Lomarch, it was after the reservation period 
had ended that the court determined the method of 
compensation.123 Official map regulations are intended to last until 
the government condemns the land. Thus, often the regulation will 
not be temporary, but will last until the property is physically taken 
from the landowner. For this reason, this Comment proposes a new 
method to compensate landowners affected by official map 
reservations so that landowners will be fairly dealt with, whether the 
land is returned to them after the reservation period or whether the 
government buys the land, and so that landowners can receive 
compensation immediately instead of suing for compensation years 
later when the government decides not to purchase the property. 
This Comment proposes a new possible compensation scenario 
that is tailored to official maps.124 The proposed compensation 
method is essentially a hybrid of the temporary takings methods.125  
VI. A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
This section describes in detail a proposed solution for 
compensating landowners regulated by an official map. The 
proposed solution includes who will be compensated, how 
compensation will be decided, and other details that may limit the 
compensation requirement. 
The best solution to protect landowners who cannot use their 
land as they desire because their land is plotted on an official map is 
to compensate them by statute for the property taken during the 
restriction period. This compensation will not be the entire value of 
the land, but rather a value far less than the actual purchase price. 
Compensation is necessary because local governments need to take 
the planning process seriously when adopting official maps. 
Obviously, it is of utmost importance to allow a community to plan 
for future growth, including future roadways, but conversely, “a 
strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough 
to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the 
constitutional way of paying for the change.”126  Thus, state statutes 
 
 122. Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124. The solution proposed in this Comment is just that: a proposal. Each state has 
several alternatives to choose from in adopting its compensation statute.  
 125. See infra Part VI.B for a detailed analysis. 
 126. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). 
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can protect landowners by requiring municipalities to compensate 
landowners for official map regulation.  
A. Who Will Be Compensated 
In this proposed method of compensation, the local government 
will pay a low price to every landowner affected by the reservation—
whether or not the landowner is burdened by the regulation. This 
will deter the government from reserving land in a haphazard 
manner, but at the same time the compensation will be low enough 
that the government will still be willing to pay the landowner and 
reserve the land.  
A valid criticism of a state statute that requires the government 
to compensate any landowner whose land is restricted by an official 
map is that some landowners will continue to have beneficial use of 
their land even with the restriction in place. Some landowners might 
not plan on requesting a building permit for their land in the bed of 
a mapped street. An official map regulation merely restricts new 
development on land plotted on the official map; it does not restrict 
the owner from using the land for any other purpose.127 For 
example, if the landowner lives in a house on the bed of a mapped 
street, this landowner will not be affected by the official map 
regulation because the house is already built and will be paid for 
when the government uses its eminent domain power to buy the 
property. The same result applies for land that is used for agriculture; 
the owner can continue to use the land for agriculture and will not 
be affected by the official map regulation. Each state can decide 
whether to compensate all landowners with property on the official 
map or only those who are burdened by the regulation. However, 
this Comment recommends that every landowner with restrictions 
on the use of her land be entitled to compensation. 
This section now discusses two valid options to determine who 
should be compensated. The first option, which this Comment 
endorses, holds that regardless of whether landowners plan on 
building on their property, the official map regulation still deprives 
these landowners use of their property, and thus, these landowners 
should be compensated. The rationales behind this solution are that 
the government should take the planning process seriously and that 
private property deserves more protection. The compensation 
 
 127. See Kucirek & Beuscher, supra note 6. 
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offered to all landowners affected should be low enough that it will 
not greatly burden the government, but high enough to discourage 
governments from restricting landowners if they do not have a well-
calculated plan.  
The second option is based on the argument that it would be 
unreasonable to compensate landowners who are not negatively 
affected by the official map regulation. Thus, a state could choose to 
adopt a statute that requires the landowner to file a claim showing 
their proposed plans to use their land and how the regulation 
burdens them. Those landowners that are using their land for 
agriculture would not need compensation because they are still 
getting full use out of the land. They would still get paid fair-market 
value when the government condemns the land, but there would be 
no reason to pay them during the reservation period if they are not 
burdened.  Either of the two options discussed above would be 
permissible and could be chosen based on the needs of the state; 
however, this Comment favors the first option. 
B. How Compensation Will Be Paid 
Several methods of compensation have been discussed in this 
Comment. There are generally two different compensation methods 
that this Comment proposes as valid: one method is for the 
landowner to show the actual damages (lost use) caused by a 
regulation, and the other method is a conceptual method where an 
appraiser provides an estimate for the market value of the property 
and pays the landowner a proportion of that estimate. While both of 
these methods are valid, this Comment proposes a hybrid method 
that is preferable. 
The actual damages method is beneficial because it allows 
burdened landowners to take the initiative to protect their property 
rights. It puts the burden on the landowner to come forward with a 
claim; thus, it may reduce compensation, because not everyone will 
come forward with a claim of actual damages. But the actual 
damages method is also problematic because it sometimes leads to 
litigation.  
The fair market value method is beneficial because it provides 
clarity: all landowners know they will be paid according to the 
market value of their property. This method is also fair because it 
protects all landowners whose land is restricted. But this method of 
compensation may be concerning because it will often 
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overcompensate a landowner. This Comment proposes a hybrid 
solution that captures the advantages from each of the methods. 
This Comment proposes that the landowner should be 
compensated per year of reservation, and the compensation should 
be determined as one percent of the land value per year. The 
government would also be required to notify and offer compensation 
to the landowners whose properties are on the official map. After the 
government notifies the landowners, each landowner would carry the 
responsibility to file a claim with the city to receive compensation.  
The state would be wise to adopt a statute that provides 
compensation only after the landowner comes forward with the 
claim, meaning that the compensation period would not start at the 
time the official map was adopted but rather when the landowner 
files the claim. In Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, the Fifth Circuit 
held that a regulation does not become a taking until the 
municipality has had reasonable time to review the regulation after 
the landowner’s claim.128 And the Supreme Court has held that “no 
constitutional violation occurs until just compensation has been 
denied.”129 Others have explained the benefits and policy behind 
delaying the date of a taking:  
Delaying the effective date of the taking until a landowner has 
sought and been denied administrative relief limits compensation 
awards and avoids rewarding landowners who are not diligent in 
protecting their rights: A landowner who waits until a year after the 
enactment of a regulation to challenge it should not be rewarded 
for waiting.130 
The Hernandez court further reasoned that landowner delays in 
seeking compensation will increase the lump sum of the 
compensation award and subject the government to unforeseen 
financial liability.131 
Further, the government should offer the initial estimate of the 
land value, but the landowner should be able to challenge this 
 
 128. 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981). 
 129. Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 
n.13 (1985). But see San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 658 
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that a taking occurred at the time the statute was 
enacted). 
 130. J. Margaret Tretbar, Comment, Calculating Compensation for Temporary 
Regulatory Takings, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 201, 214 (1993). 
 131. Hernandez, 643 F.2d at 1200–01. 
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estimate if the landowner believes it is too low. The burden should 
also be on the landowner to prove that the land value is higher than 
the value the government proposed. The ability of the landowner to 
litigate if the government is being unfair will likely keep the 
government honest, since the government also wants to avoid 
litigation costs. 
While all landowners that file a claim will receive the low 
compensation amount of one percent of their land value, other 
landowners that feel particularly burdened by the reservation should 
be permitted to prove actual damages and receive greater 
compensation. Conversely, the government should have the 
opportunity to prove that the official map has increased the market 
value of the landowner’s property, and thus take into consideration 
that benefit and reduce the amount of cash compensation 
accordingly. 
In many instances, a proposed road or highway will increase the 
value of a landowner’s property that abuts the road. The government 
should thus be permitted to prove that it increases the market value 
of the landowner’s land, reducing the amount of compensation 
necessary. In U.S. v. Miller, the Court held that “if [a] taking [of a 
portion of a landowner’s property] has in fact benefitted the 
remainder the benefit may be set off against the value of the land 
taken.”132 This applies to official maps because it is likely that the 
location of a future road or highway can increase land values via the 
future prospect of profits along that front. 
C. Short-Term Reservations 
The proposed solution also includes an exception for short-term 
reservation periods. After the Lomarch decision and the amendment 
to the New Jersey compensation statute, a New Jersey court held 
that a 120-day reservation period would not entitle a landowner to 
compensation.133 Similarly, the Supreme Court in First English held 
that normal delays in administrative proceedings do not amount to a 
 
 132. United States. v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376 (1943); see also 33 U.S.C. § 595 (2006) 
(explaining that those in charge of valuing compensation “shall take into consideration by way 
of reducing the amount of compensation or damages any special and direct benefits to the 
remainder arising from the improvement”). 
 133. Kingston E. Realty Co. v. New Jersey ex. rel. Comm’r of Transp., 336 A.2d 40, 45 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975). 
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taking.134 So the process of government decision-making, though it 
may decrease land value, can be viewed as an “incident[] of 
ownership . . . [and] cannot be considered as a ‘taking’ in the 
constitutional sense.”135  
For example, in Ward v. Bennett, the court declared that a city 
does have the power to temporarily restrict land use without 
compensation in order to conduct studies toward a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme as long as the duration of the temporary 
restriction is reasonable.136 Though the court did not state what a 
reasonable duration would be, the Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra 
mentioned that a temporary restriction greater than one year should 
be examined with greater scrutiny.137  
Thus, this Comment proposes that the city should have up to 
one year to reserve property, without compensation, on the official 
map as long as the city is actively planning during this time period. 
Once the one year period ends or if the city is merely sitting on the 
land, the compensation period would begin. The landowner would 
have the burden to ensure that the city is actively planning during 
the one year reservation period. 
In summary, this proposed solution works to strike a fair balance 
between both the landowners and the government. The proposed 
statute tends to favor the landowners and property rights in general, 
in that every landowner with property on the official map can receive 
compensation. On the other hand, the proposal favors the 
government with the provision that allows the government one year 
of active planning without a compensation requirement.  
 
 134. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 321 (1987). 
 135.  Tretbar, supra note 130, at 206 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). But see id. at 207 (“[T]he effect of an ultimately invalid regulation prohibiting 
development of property held for future use is often simply a delay in development or an 
impairment of the landowner’s ability to plan for future development. This scenario presents 
the basis for some commentators’ claims that compensation for temporary regulatory takings in 
general will result in ‘windfalls’ to affected landowners. Indeed, the temporary diminution in 
value of a parcel of property may be viewed as a mere fluctuation when viewed in retrospect 
after the regulation has been rescinded. This perspective is flawed, however, because it fails to 
take into account the position of the landowner when the regulation was enacted or when the 
landowner applied for a development permit.” (citations omitted)). 
 136. 625 N.Y.S.2d 609, 613 (App. Div. 1995). 
 137. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
341 (2002). 
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D. Other Relevant Questions 
The complexity of official maps may raise several other questions 
that have not yet been considered in this Comment. This section 
discusses these questions along with their implications and solutions. 
1. Set-back regulations 
Many official maps incorporate not only future streets, but also 
future widening of current streets as well. A set-back restriction 
requires the landowner to keep property a specified distance from the 
edge of the roadway. The Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of set-back regulations in 1927.138  
Similarly, in Mayer v. Dade County, the Supreme Court of 
Florida upheld a set-back provision that precluded the landowners 
from constructing a hospital on their property.139 The set-back 
regulation in that case did not provide ample space for a hospital, but 
the court held that because there were many other profitable uses of 
the land, it would not amount to a taking.140 On the other hand, the 
Florida Supreme Court has also held that a set-back regulation 
prohibiting the only use to which a property has been adapted is 
unconstitutional.141 
Set-back ordinances serve many purposes, such as preserving 
visibility for traffic safety and providing room for fire-fighting 
access.142 Set-back restrictions also create an aesthetically pleasing 
look for a neighborhood.143 In Mahon, the Supreme Court held that 
to justify exercising the police power, there should be “‘an average 
reciprocity of advantage’ as between the owner of the property 
restricted and the rest of the community.”144 Clearly, a set-back 
restriction does not single a landowner out, but restricts all 
landowners on a street for the benefit of the landowners as a whole. 
 
 138. Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 604 (1927). 
 139. 82 So. 2d 513, 519 (Fla. 1955). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Ocean Villa Apartments, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 70 So. 2d 901, 902–03 
(Fla. 1954). 
 142. CALLIES ET AL., supra note 6, at 86. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922). 
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Further, many zoning ordinances already require landowners to 
abide by set-back restrictions.145 A set-back restriction in an official 
map should not be any different. Therefore, set-back restrictions 
should be valid without a compensation requirement. 
2. Unforeseen growth changes 
Critics may argue that providing compensation to landowners 
regulated by an official map will not work because governments need 
the freedom to change their plans without incurring high costs in the 
meantime. Given the unpredictable nature of both urban growth and 
economic growth and decline, it is impossible for local governments 
to ever know for sure if they will actually follow through on their 
official map or not. To make the local government pay compensation 
every time they adopt an official map is akin to punishing them for 
not being able to see the future. 
Others may argue that state statutes like New Jersey’s will lock 
governments into their initial decisions, forcing them to stick with a 
plan that turned out to be less than ideal, even if they could change 
it to something much better later. Local governments will be 
reluctant to fix planning mistakes because they do not want the 
compensation paid in the meantime to be wasted. 
While this is a valid criticism, it does not overcome the benefits 
of a compensation statute. Again, the local government will already 
be saving money from not having to litigate every case, and it has 
one year to actively plan without compensation, which should be 
sufficient time to decide whether the plan is feasible. Further, even if 
the government sticks with original planning decisions that later 
seem imperfect, a compensation statute will still be beneficial for 
several reasons. First, if the government thought the plan was a good 
enough idea to put it on the official map and start paying 
compensation, it is doubtful that circumstances will have changed so 
much that it would later become unworkable. Perhaps a new plan 
may be a little better for future growth patterns, but whatever slight 
advantages might be gained from allowing the government to 
change its plans haphazardly does not seem to outweigh the damage 
done to private property rights—which should be among the 
government’s highest priorities, as demonstrated in the Declaration 
 
 145. Kucirek & Beuscher, supra note 6. 
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of Independence and the Fifth Amendment.146 Second, it is likely 
that local land use decisions like those included in an official map will 
actually help shape development and growth. Telling the public 
where a road is going to be, for example, will likely influence 
developers’ decisions about where to build businesses and homes, 
and those businesses and homes will be designed to take advantage 
of that road and help reinforce the government’s decision. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The unpredictability of official maps cases has been a problem for 
decades. Courts have had trouble, as they have examined the facts on 
a case-by-case basis, determining when an official map regulation 
qualifies as a regulatory taking. The Supreme Court takings cases 
have not served as helpful guidelines in determining official maps 
cases, so it is time to look for a new solution that can provide 
predictability and fairness. 
State legislatures can help dissipate the trouble that courts have 
had in deciding official maps cases by adopting statutes that provide 
compensation to landowners affected by official map regulations. 
Several benefits will spring from a statute providing compensation: 
the government will take the planning process more seriously, there 
will be a reduction in litigation, private property will receive greater 
protection, and there will be more predictability in the law. State 
legislatures, therefore, should eliminate confusion and promote 












 146. U.S. CONST. amend. V; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 
1776). 
 .  J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University. 
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